openSUSE Leap, Tumbleweed & MicroOS Provisioning: Btrfs Subvolumes, Snapper Rollbacks, AutoYaST/Agama & Transactional Updates
Created: 2026-11-06 · Last updated: 2026-11-13 · Nejat Hakan
Executive Summary: openSUSE and SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES) represent the global engineering benchmark for resilient Copy-on-Write filesystem architectures: whether deploying the enterprise-grade openSUSE Leap, the openQA-verified rolling release openSUSE Tumbleweed, or the immutable openSUSE MicroOS / Leap Micro, SUSE integrates Btrfs subvolumes, Snapper, Zypper (
libsolv), and GRUB2 out of the box so seamlessly that any faulty kernel or package upgrade can be rolled back directly from the UEFI boot menu in seconds. This enterprise masterclass walks through hardened production deployments: Cryptographic ISO verification, the fine-grained SUSE Btrfs subvolume topology with LUKS2, zero-touch fleet provisioning via AutoYaST (autoinst.xml) & Agama, TPM 2.0 hardware unlock (fdectl&systemd-cryptenroll), Snapper forensics & rollbacks, Zypper SAT solver administration, atomictransactional-updateoperations, Wicked/NetworkManager LACP bonding, SUSEchkstatsecurity profiles, and the live-ISO chroot rescue runbook.
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1. ISO Verification, openQA & Lineage
Validate installation media against the official openSUSE GPG signing key, deconstruct the automated openQA testing pipeline, and select between Leap (SLES), Tumbleweed, and MicroOS.
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2. SUSE Btrfs Topology & LUKS2
Master the SUSE reference layout (
@/.snapshots/1/snapshot,@/varwithnodatacow,@/home,@/srv,@/boot/grub2/*) alongside LUKS2 encryption and Btrfs quotas. -
3. Zero-Touch: AutoYaST & Agama
Automate unattended bare-metal and VM rollouts using both classic AutoYaST (
autoinst.xml) profiles and modern declarative Agama JSON manifests. -
4. TPM2 Hardware Unlock (
fdectl)
Unlock encrypted system partitions automatically using SUSE's
fde-tools(fdectl tpm-authorize) for GRUB2 orsystemd-cryptenroll(PCR 0+7+14) for Dracut. -
5. Snapper & Bootable Rollbacks
Boot directly into historical read-only snapshots from the UEFI GRUB2 menu, audit configuration diffs (
snapper diff/undochange), and restore viasnapper rollback. -
6. Zypper SAT Solver (
libsolv)
Resolve dependencies with Boolean Satisfiability precision (
zypper dupvs.zypper patch), govern repository priorities, pin packages (al), and detect stale process libraries (zypper ps -s). -
7. MicroOS &
transactional-update
Operate immutable read-only root filesystems where updates execute isolated inside a cloned Btrfs snapshot and activate atomically upon reboot.
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8. Enterprise Network: Wicked & NM
Configure redundant 802.3ad LACP bonding (
bond0) and 802.1Q VLAN trunks declaratively via SUSE's Wicked (/etc/sysconfig/network/) or NetworkManager (nmcli). -
9.
chkstat, AppArmor/SELinux & Firewall
Enforce SUSE's systemic file permission engine (
chkstat --systemwith profilesecure), Mandatory Access Control (AppArmor & SELinux), andfirewalldzones. -
10. YaST2 TUI & Btrfs Rescue Runbook
Administer headless servers over SSH via the ncurses control plane (
yast2) and rescue SUSE's@/.snapshots/N/snapshotsubvolume tree from a Live ISO.
1. Cryptographic ISO Verification, openQA Pipeline & SUSE Lineage
The SUSE ecosystem is structured around three distinct enterprise platforms sharing a unified foundation of YaST2 / Agama, Zypper (libsolv), and Btrfs + Snapper:
| Distribution Line | Release Model & SLES Relationship | Primary Production Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| openSUSE Leap (15.6 / 16) | Fixed point release with 1:1 binary and source parity with SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES) | Long-term stable database, ERP, SAP, and core infrastructure servers |
| openSUSE Tumbleweed | Curated rolling release; every snapshot is published only after passing hundreds of automated openQA full-system tests | Engineering workstations and servers requiring bleeding-edge kernels |
| openSUSE MicroOS / Leap Micro | Immutable operating system featuring a read-only root filesystem and atomic transactional-update rollouts |
Hardened container hosts (Podman / Kubernetes) and edge appliances |
1.1 Cryptographic Verification of the Installation Media
Before flashing any downloaded ISO image to USB media, verify its detached signature against the official openSUSE Project Signing Key (22C0 7BA5 3417 8CD0 2EFE 22AA B88B 2FD4 3DBD C284 or the 4096-bit RSA key 39DB 7C82):
# 1. Fetch the official openSUSE Project Signing Key and verify its fingerprint
gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.openpgp.org --recv-keys 22C07BA534178CD02EFE22AAB88B2FD43DBDC284
gpg --fingerprint 22C07BA534178CD02EFE22AAB88B2FD43DBDC284
# 2. Validate the detached GPG signature (.sha256.asc) of the checksum file
gpg --verify openSUSE-Leap-15.6-DVD-x86_64-Current.iso.sha256.asc \
openSUSE-Leap-15.6-DVD-x86_64-Current.iso.sha256
# 3. Verify the cryptographic SHA-256 hash of the ISO image
sha256sum -c openSUSE-Leap-15.6-DVD-x86_64-Current.iso.sha256
2. The openSUSE Btrfs Subvolume Architecture & LUKS2 Encryption
Unlike rudimentary Btrfs installations that place the entire root filesystem inside a single flat subvolume, SUSE engineered a fine-grained multi-subvolume hierarchy.
On openSUSE, the active root filesystem (/) is not statically bound to @; instead, the Btrfs default subvolume pointer dynamically targets the currently active Snapper snapshot (initially @/.snapshots/1/snapshot after installation). When you roll back to snapshot #42 from the boot menu, Snapper simply repoints the Btrfs default subvolume to @/.snapshots/42/snapshot!
%%{init: {'flowchart': {'wrappingWidth': 350}}}%%
flowchart TB
subgraph S1 ["1. UEFI Secure Boot & GRUB2-Btrfs"]
direction TB
SHIM["Signed shim.efi<br/>(SUSE + Microsoft UEFI CA)"]
GRUB["GRUB2 Bootloader<br/>Parses /.snapshots/*/info.xml"]
SHIM --> GRUB
end
subgraph S2 ["2. LUKS2 Container & Dracut"]
direction TB
LUKS["LUKS2 Full-Disk Encryption<br/>TPM2 (fdectl / cryptenroll)"]
POOL["Btrfs Top-Level Pool<br/>(subvolid=5, Quotas Enabled)"]
LUKS --> POOL
end
subgraph S3 ["3. Dynamic Root Snapshot"]
direction TB
ACT["Active Root Subvolume<br/>@/.snapshots/1/snapshot (/)"]
RO["Historical RO Snapshots<br/>@/.snapshots/42/snapshot"]
ACT --> RO
end
subgraph S4 ["4. Subvolumes Excluded from Rollback"]
direction TB
VAR["@/var (nodatacow)<br/>Logs, DBs & Containers Persist"]
USR["@/home, @/srv, @/opt,<br/>@/tmp & @/boot/grub2/*"]
VAR --> USR
end
S1 ==> S2 ==> S3 ==> S4
2.1 Why @/var, @/srv, and @/boot/grub2/* Are Excluded from Rollbacks
| Subvolume | Mountpoint | Special Attributes | Architectural Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
@/.snapshots/N/snapshot |
/ |
Btrfs default subvolume |
Contains /usr, /etc, /bin, /lib. Snapshotted on every zypper run and swapped atomically during snapper rollback. |
@/.snapshots |
/.snapshots |
Quota Group (1/0) |
Stores all read-only snapshots alongside their XML metadata (info.xml). |
@/var |
/var |
nodatacow (chattr +C) |
Holds databases (/var/lib/pgsql), containers (/var/lib/containers), and system logs (/var/log). Must never be reverted during an OS rollback! |
@/home |
/home |
nodev,nosuid |
User home directories remain untouched across OS rollbacks. |
@/srv & @/opt |
/srv, /opt |
nodev |
Persistent web/application payloads and third-party software suites. |
@/tmp |
/tmp |
nodev,nosuid,noexec |
Prevents temporary files from polluting root system snapshots. |
@/boot/grub2/x86_64-efi |
/boot/grub2/x86_64-efi |
Architecture-specific | Ensures GRUB2 stage files remain consistently addressable across snapshot transitions. |
# 1. Check which snapshot is currently active as the default root subvolume (/)
sudo btrfs subvolume get-default /
# 2. List all SUSE subvolumes
sudo btrfs subvolume list /
# 3. Inspect Btrfs Quota Groups (qgroups) and exclusive space consumed per snapshot
sudo btrfs qgroup show -reF /
3. Zero-Touch Fleet Provisioning via AutoYaST (autoinst.xml) & Agama
SUSE supports two declarative automation engines for unattended installations:
- AutoYaST (
autoinst.xml): The battle-tested enterprise standard for openSUSE Leap 15.6 and SLES 15 (passed via kernel parameterautoyast=https://deploy.internal/autoinst.xmlor placed on a USB volume labeledOEMDRV). - Agama (
agama config load): The modern D-Bus and REST-API installer powering openSUSE Leap 16, Tumbleweed, and MicroOS, driven by concise JSON manifests.
3.1 Production AutoYaST Profile (autoinst.xml for Leap / SLES)
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE profile>
<profile xmlns="http://www.suse.com/1.0/yast2ns" xmlns:config="http://www.suse.com/1.0/configns">
<general>
<mode>
<confirm config:type="boolean">false</confirm>
<final_reboot config:type="boolean">true</final_reboot>
</mode>
</general>
<language>
<language>en_US</language>
<languages>en_US,de_DE</languages>
</language>
<keyboard>
<keymap>german</keymap>
</keyboard>
<timezone>
<hwclock>UTC</hwclock>
<timezone>Europe/Berlin</timezone>
</timezone>
<!-- LUKS2-encrypted GPT/Btrfs layout with Snapper enabled -->
<partitioning config:type="list">
<drive>
<device>/dev/nvme0n1</device>
<disklabel>gpt</disklabel>
<enable_snapshots config:type="boolean">true</enable_snapshots>
<use>all</use>
<partitions config:type="list">
<partition>
<create config:type="boolean">true</create>
<filesystem config:type="symbol">vfat</filesystem>
<mount>/boot/efi</mount>
<size>512M</size>
</partition>
<partition>
<create config:type="boolean">true</create>
<crypt_fs config:type="boolean">true</crypt_fs>
<crypt_method config:type="symbol">luks2</crypt_method>
<crypt_key>InitialInstallPassphrase-EnrollTPM2AfterBoot</crypt_key>
<filesystem config:type="symbol">btrfs</filesystem>
<mount>/</mount>
<size>max</size>
<quotas config:type="boolean">true</quotas>
</partition>
</partitions>
</drive>
</partitioning>
<!-- Software patterns & SUSE security baseline -->
<software>
<patterns config:type="list">
<pattern>base</pattern>
<pattern>enhanced_base</pattern>
<pattern>apparmor</pattern>
</patterns>
<packages config:type="list">
<package>openssh</package>
<package>firewalld</package>
<package>snapper</package>
<package>vim</package>
<package>tmux</package>
<package>git-core</package>
</packages>
</software>
<!-- User accounts & SSH Ed25519 public key -->
<users config:type="list">
<user>
<username>root</username>
<user_password>!</user_password>
<encrypted config:type="boolean">true</encrypted>
</user>
<user>
<username>sysadmin</username>
<user_password>$6$rounds=656000$SaltValue$SHA512HashHere</user_password>
<encrypted config:type="boolean">true</encrypted>
<authorized_keys config:type="list">
<listentry>ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAI... sysadmin@workstation</listentry>
</authorized_keys>
</user>
</users>
</profile>
3.2 Declarative Agama JSON Profile (Leap 16 / Tumbleweed / MicroOS)
{
"product": {
"id": "Tumbleweed"
},
"localization": {
"language": "en_US.UTF-8",
"keyboard": "de-nodeadkeys",
"timezone": "Europe/Berlin"
},
"user": {
"fullName": "System Administrator",
"userName": "sysadmin",
"password": "$6$rounds=656000$SaltValue$SHA512HashHere",
"hashedPassword": true,
"autologin": false
},
"root": {
"sshPublicKey": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAI... sysadmin@workstation"
},
"storage": {
"boot": {
"configure": true,
"device": "/dev/nvme0n1"
},
"drives": [
{
"search": "/dev/nvme0n1",
"spacePolicy": "delete",
"partitions": [
{
"mountPath": "/",
"filesystem": {
"type": "btrfs",
"snapshots": true
},
"encryption": {
"luks2": {
"password": "InitialInstallPassphrase-EnrollTPM2AfterBoot",
"pbkdFunction": "argon2id"
}
}
}
]
}
]
}
}
4. Hardware Auto-Unlock: TPM 2.0 (fdectl & systemd-cryptenroll) & Dracut
When deploying full-disk encryption on openSUSE, two hardware-backed decryption mechanisms are available depending on your boot layout:
- GRUB2 Cryptodisk +
fde-tools(fdectl): When/bootresides inside the encrypted Btrfs container, GRUB2 itself unlocks the LUKS2 volume before loading the kernel. SUSE providesfdectlto seal the LUKS2 key against UEFI Secure Boot PCRs and automatically re-authorize policies across kernel/bootloader upgrades. - Dracut +
systemd-cryptenroll: When using a separate unencrypted/boot(orsystemd-booton Tumbleweed/MicroOS),systemd-cryptenrollinside the Dracut initramfs unlocks the volume via PCR 0+7+14.
# Method A: SUSE fde-tools for GRUB2 Full-Disk Encryption (sealed against TPM 2.0)
sudo zypper install -y fde-tools
sudo fdectl tpm-authorize
# Method B: systemd-cryptenroll + Dracut (PCR 0+7+14 binding)
sudo systemd-cryptenroll \
--tpm2-device=auto \
--tpm2-pcrs=0+7+14 \
/dev/nvme0n1p2
# Update /etc/crypttab and regenerate all Dracut initramfs images
sudo sed -i 's/none/none tpm2-device=auto,discard/' /etc/crypttab
sudo dracut -f --regenerate-all
5. Snapper Deep Dive & Bootable GRUB2 Rollbacks
The zypp-plugin-snapper integration wraps every Zypper transaction automatically:
- Before installation (
pre): Snapper takes a read-only Btrfs snapshot of the current root filesystem (e.g.,#42). - Package transaction: Zypper installs updated kernels, libraries, or configuration files.
- After installation (
post): Snapper records the corresponding post-transaction snapshot (e.g.,#43) and registers it directly inside the UEFI GRUB2 menu (Start bootloader from a read-only snapshot) viagrub2-snapper-plugin.
5.1 Forensic File Comparisons & Single-File Restoration
You do not need to roll back the entire operating system if a package upgrade merely overwrote a single configuration file in /etc:
# 1. List all pre/post snapshot pairs with timestamps and Zypper command descriptions
sudo snapper -c root list
# 2. List all modified files between Pre-Snapshot #42 and Post-Snapshot #43
# Legend: '+' = added, '-' = deleted, 'c' = content changed, 'p' = permissions changed
sudo snapper -c root status 42..43
# 3. View the exact line-by-line unified diff of a specific file between snapshots 42 and 43
sudo snapper -c root diff 42..43 /etc/ssh/sshd_config
# 4. Revert ONLY a single configuration file back to its state in Snapshot #42 (no reboot needed!)
sudo snapper -c root undochange 42..43 /etc/ssh/sshd_config
# 5. Full Atomic System Rollback:
# Option A: Roll back directly from the running system to Snapshot #42
sudo snapper rollback 42
sudo systemctl reboot
# Option B: Boot into read-only Snapshot #42 from the GRUB2 menu, verify health, and run:
# sudo snapper rollback && sudo systemctl reboot
5.2 Hardening Retention Quotas in /etc/snapper/configs/root
To prevent old kernel snapshots from exhausting disk capacity, cap the retained number snapshots and restrict the snapshot pool to a maximum of 30% of the Btrfs filesystem (SPACE_LIMIT="0.3"):
QGROUP="1/0"
SPACE_LIMIT="0.3"
FREE_LIMIT="0.2"
TIMELINE_CREATE="no"
NUMBER_CLEANUP="yes"
NUMBER_MIN_AGE="1800"
NUMBER_LIMIT="10"
NUMBER_LIMIT_IMPORTANT="5"
6. Mastering Zypper SAT Solver (libsolv), Repository Priorities & Package Locks
At its core, Zypper relies on libsolv to resolve complex dependency graphs using Boolean Satisfiability (SAT). Choosing the right upgrade subcommand is essential for production stability:
| Distribution Line | Production Upgrade Command | SAT Solver Behavior |
|---|---|---|
| openSUSE Tumbleweed | sudo zypper dup --no-recommends |
Synchronizes the host to the exact state of the latest openQA-validated snapshot (handling package splits, renames, and architecture transitions). |
| openSUSE Leap / SLES | sudo zypper patch --category security or sudo zypper up |
Applies tested maintenance and security advisories within the fixed enterprise point release while strictly preserving vendor stickiness. |
| openSUSE MicroOS | sudo transactional-update dup |
Executes the upgrade atomically inside a background Btrfs snapshot clone; takes effect only upon the next reboot. |
# 1. List all active repositories sorted by priority and display GPG check status
zypper lr -P -u
# 2. Elevate priority of a trusted repository (e.g., priority 70 instead of default 99)
# (Lower number = Higher priority!)
sudo zypper mr -p 70 1
# 3. Lock critical packages (e.g., PostgreSQL or kernel versions) against upgrades (Add Lock)
sudo zypper al postgresql17-server
zypper ll
# 4. After an upgrade, identify running processes still holding deleted shared libraries in RAM
sudo zypper ps -s
# 5. Restart all affected systemd services reported by 'zypper ps -sss' automatically
for svc in $(sudo zypper ps -sss); do
sudo systemctl restart "$svc"
done
7. Immutable Infrastructure: openSUSE MicroOS & transactional-update
On openSUSE MicroOS and SUSE Linux Enterprise Micro (SLE Micro), the root filesystem (/) is mounted strictly read-only (ro) during runtime. Neither package managers nor attackers can modify files under /usr, /bin, or /lib.
How are security updates or packages applied? Through the transactional-update engine:
transactional-updateclones the currently booted read-only snapshot (#14) into a new writable Btrfs target snapshot (#15) in the background.- It mounts a dedicated OverlayFS layer for
/etc. - The update (
zypper duporzypper in) executes inside an isolatedchrootwithin snapshot#15—leaving the running production system (#14) 100% untouched! - Once complete, snapshot
#15is flipped to read-only (ro) and flagged as the default boot target for the next reboot. If any step fails, snapshot#15is discarded cleanly.
# 1. Inspect transactional snapshot status
sudo transactional-update status
# 2. Layer an additional system utility (e.g., htop or tailscale) for the next boot
sudo transactional-update pkg install htop tailscale
# 3. Trigger an atomic distribution upgrade manually and reboot when ready
sudo transactional-update dup
sudo systemctl reboot
# 4. Configure an automated maintenance reboot window via rebootmgr (/etc/rebootmgr.conf)
cat << 'EOF' | sudo tee /etc/rebootmgr.conf
[rebootmgr]
window-start=03:30
window-duration=1h
strategy=best-effort
EOF
sudo systemctl enable --now transactional-update.timer rebootmgr.service
8. Enterprise Networking: Wicked vs. NetworkManager (802.3ad LACP & VLANs)
While Tumbleweed and Leap 16 use NetworkManager (nmcli) by default, openSUSE Leap 15.6 / SLES 15 servers traditionally use SUSE's declarative XML/ifcfg-driven network daemon Wicked (wickedd.service).
8.1 802.3ad LACP Bonding & VLAN Trunking with SUSE Wicked (/etc/sysconfig/network/)
BOOTPROTO='none'
STARTMODE='auto'
BONDING_MASTER='yes'
BONDING_SLAVE_0='eth0'
BONDING_SLAVE_1='eth1'
BONDING_MODULE_OPTS='mode=802.3ad miimon=100 lacp_rate=fast xmit_hash_policy=layer3+4'
IPADDR='10.30.10.20/24'
BOOTPROTO='none'
STARTMODE='hotplug'
MASTER_DEVICE='bond0'
BOOTPROTO='static'
STARTMODE='auto'
ETHERDEVICE='bond0'
VLAN_ID='100'
IPADDR='10.30.100.20/24'
# 1. Define the default gateway in /etc/sysconfig/network/ifroute-bond0
echo "default 10.30.10.1 - bond0" | sudo tee /etc/sysconfig/network/ifroute-bond0
# 2. Validate XML compilation and bring up all interfaces without rebooting
sudo wicked show-config
sudo wicked ifup all
sudo wicked ifstatus --verbose all
9. Security Baseline: chkstat Permissions, AppArmor/SELinux & firewalld
9.1 SUSE's Systemic File Permission Engine: /etc/sysconfig/security & chkstat
openSUSE and SLES include a powerful security enforcement tool rarely found in other distributions: chkstat. Controlled via PERMISSION_SECURITY, chkstat audits and enforces file ownership, permissions, capabilities, and SUID/SGID bits across the entire OS against curated security profiles (/etc/permissions.easy, /etc/permissions.secure, /etc/permissions.paranoid).
On production servers, switch from easy to secure local—stripping unnecessary SUID-root bits from dozens of system binaries and locking down world-readable access to sensitive system directories:
# 1. Set PERMISSION_SECURITY to 'secure local' in /etc/sysconfig/security
sudo sed -i 's/^PERMISSION_SECURITY=.*/PERMISSION_SECURITY="secure local"/' /etc/sysconfig/security
# 2. Define custom local overrides in /etc/permissions.local if required
# Format: <path> <owner:group> <octal-mode>
# 3. Audit permission changes across the filesystem (--dry-run) and enforce them (--set)
sudo chkstat --system --dry-run
sudo chkstat --system --set
9.2 AppArmor / SELinux & firewalld Hardening
# 1. Inspect AppArmor enforcement status (or run 'sestatus' when using SELinux on MicroOS/Tumbleweed)
sudo aa-status
# 2. Lock down firewalld to restrict SSH access strictly to the management subnet
sudo firewall-cmd --permanent --remove-service=dhcpv6-client
sudo firewall-cmd --permanent --remove-service=ssh
sudo firewall-cmd --permanent --add-rich-rule='rule family="ipv4" source address="10.30.10.0/24" service name="ssh" accept'
sudo firewall-cmd --reload
sudo firewall-cmd --list-all
10. YaST2 Headless TUI & Live-ISO Chroot Emergency Runbook
10.1 Headless Administration via the YaST2 ncurses TUI
Even on minimal headless servers without a graphical environment, the full YaST2 control plane is accessible over SSH via its ncurses terminal interface (sudo yast2 or jumping directly to specific modules such as sudo yast2 bootloader, sudo yast2 security, sudo yast2 firewall).
10.2 Emergency Runbook: Chrooting into SUSE's @/.snapshots/N/snapshot from a Live ISO
Critical Nuance When Chrooting an openSUSE Btrfs System
Because the active root filesystem on openSUSE points to @/.snapshots/N/snapshot while /var, /boot/grub2/x86_64-efi, and /.snapshots reside in separate subvolumes, merely running mount /dev/mapper/cr_root /mnt is not sufficient to run grub2-mkconfig or dracut! Once inside the chroot, you must execute mount -a so all subvolumes defined in /etc/fstab are mounted into place.
# 1. Boot from the openSUSE Rescue ISO and unlock the LUKS2 partition
cryptsetup open /dev/nvme0n1p2 cr_root
# 2. Mount the active Btrfs default subvolume (@/.snapshots/N/snapshot) at /mnt
mount /dev/mapper/cr_root /mnt
# 3. Bind-mount virtual kernel filesystems and UEFI runtime variables
for dir in /dev /dev/pts /proc /sys /sys/firmware/efi/efivars /run; do
mount --bind "$dir" "/mnt$dir"
done
# 4. Enter chroot, mount ALL SUSE Btrfs subvolumes (@/var, @/.snapshots, /boot/efi) via 'mount -a',
# and rebuild Dracut and GRUB2/Shim
chroot /mnt /bin/bash -c "
mount -a
dracut -f --regenerate-all
shim-install
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
"
# 5. Cleanly unmount and reboot
umount -R /mnt
cryptsetup close cr_root
reboot